Traduction de «concurrence imparfaite » (Français → Anglais) :

Again, in the academic studies, one of the things that's likely to influence interchange fees is whether or not there's more imperfect competition at the issuing end or more imperfect competition at the acquiring end.

Again, in the academic studies, one of the things that's likely to influence interchange fees is whether or not there's more imperfect competition at the issuing end or more imperfect competition at the acquiring end.

The reasons for the late and sluggish rebound are to be sought in structural rigidities. Important in this regard are rigidities weighing on investment, wage stickiness and imperfect competition, particularly in services.

26. has taken due note of the sector inquiry into retail banking and payment cards systems that reveals several areas in need of improvement; welcomes the prospective Payment Services Directive, which is expected to bring about better preconditions for competition in these fields; warns, however, that opening up existing imperfect systems should not lead to a situation in which a high level of market consolidation could create new imperfections and price constraints, damaging the overall structure of the European economy's financing system, the quality of local services, and the opportunities for SMEs to obtain financing suited to thei ...[+++]r needs; has taken note of the need to open access to credit registers and payment systems and asks for further clarification on the next concrete steps to be taken in this respect;

6. Considers that, while market failures persistently occur, there is a need to work with ex ante obligations, formulated in a Directive and implemented by the NRAs with notification to the Commission, in order to avoid abuse of dominant positions; advocates that Member States be required to develop and lay down a binding model for cooperation between NRAs and national competition authorities and audiovisual sector regulators; believes that NRAs must act in accordance with pre-defined guidelines published by the Commission and that the guidelines must contain market definitions in order to achieve common, objective criteria which minim ...[+++]ise the need for case-by-case assessments by regulators; notes that the question of market power is very complex, one which cannot be covered in one mechanical model; believes that the vertical, horizontal and intersectoral analysis of the economic market situation is best made at a decentralised level by the NRA or by the NRA together with the Competition Authority and that, in any situation of market failure that may arise, the NRAs must propose measures of regulation in a manner appropriate to the gradation of market failure in the sector and aimed at more competition and must consult the market players to find out if the sector can break the logjam in question without regulation; takes the view that NRAs have to justify their decisions against pre-defined guidelines published by the Commission in order to achieve common, objective criteria which minimise the need for non-objective judgements by regulators; considers that the instruments for regulating access, including interconnection, should not be extended to the mobile communications market and Internet service providers; and that the Commission must be able to challenge and possibly revoke the decisions taken by the NRAs if they are not justified according to the regulatory framework; calls for the imposed measures to be published and to be applicable for a limited peri ...

1. Wishes to compliment the European Commission on its communication, which demonstrates a broad and complete analysis and includes sensible proposals, but considers that there is a need for a clearer and unambigous formulation of the political aims and principles underlying the further development of the European telecommunications market and a further consideration of a number of themes, such as the concept of competition, the question of dealing with an imperfect market, the proposed system of Significant Market Power and Dominant Positions, general authorisation and auctions, and the institutional framework with respect to the democr ...[+++]atic basis and certainty for market players; considers that the Commission should promote the creation of a level playing field in relation to the three objectives of the 1999 Review and stresses that, in some Member States, no auctions of UMTS frequencies are held, as a result of which some ICT companies obtain UMTS frequencies at far lower prices than their competitors; points out that this does not create a level playing field; observes that the influence of governments on national ICT companies is regulated in very different ways (e.g. by means of minority holdings or golden shares) and that this has constituted an obstacle to mergers between European ICT companies; calls on the Commission to create a level playing field in this respect too;