Traduction de «collective personal security » (Anglais → Français) :

The only exclusion from this should be where due to other public policy requirements, notably in relation to efficient and transparent collection of taxation, a CSD and its participants are required to provide individual client segregation for citizens and residents of and legal persons established in a Member State where, at the date of entry into force of this Regulation, this individual client segregation is required under the national law of the Member State under which the securities ...[+++] are constituted and only for citizens, residents of and legal persons established in that Member State .

59. Does not, therefore, support third-party access to a customer's bank account information unless the system is demonstrably secure and has been thoroughly tested; notes that, in any regulation, third-party access should be limited to binary ('yes–no') information on the availability of funds, and that special attention should be paid to security, data protection and consumer rights; considers, in particular, that it should be clearly specified which parties can have access to this information on a non-discriminatory basis, and under which conditions the data can be stored, and that these provisions need to be subject to a contractua ...[+++]l relationship between the entities involved; stresses that a clear distinction between access to information on the availability of funds for a given transaction, and access to a customer's account information in general, should be made when establishing a regulatory framework for third-party access; calls on the Commission to ensure protection of personal data by proposing, after the consultation of the European Data Protection Supervisor, clear regulation as to which role each actor plays in collecting data and for which purpose, and a clear definition of the actors responsible for collecting, processing and retaining data; adds that card users should have the possibility to access and rectify their personal data, also in a complex cross border context; finds that data protection requirements should be implemented along the principle of ‘privacy by design/by default’ and that businesses or consumers should not bear the responsibility to protect their data;

59. Does not, therefore, support third-party access to a customer's bank account information unless the system is demonstrably secure and has been thoroughly tested; notes that, in any regulation, third-party access should be limited to binary ('yes–no') information on the availability of funds, and that special attention should be paid to security, data protection and consumer rights; considers, in particular, that it should be clearly specified which parties can have access to this information on a non-discriminatory basis, and under which conditions the data can be stored, and that these provisions need to be subject to a contractua ...[+++]l relationship between the entities involved; stresses that a clear distinction between access to information on the availability of funds for a given transaction, and access to a customer's account information in general, should be made when establishing a regulatory framework for third-party access; calls on the Commission to ensure protection of personal data by proposing, after the consultation of the European Data Protection Supervisor, clear regulation as to which role each actor plays in collecting data and for which purpose, and a clear definition of the actors responsible for collecting, processing and retaining data; adds that card users should have the possibility to access and rectify their personal data, also in a complex cross border context; finds that data protection requirements should be implemented along the principle of ‘privacy by design/by default’ and that businesses or consumers should not bear the responsibility to protect their data;

In addition, the Public Safety Act, 2002 amended section 7 of the PIPEDA to allow private sector institutions to collect personal information about their clients, without their consent, and to disclose it to government, law enforcement and national security agencies in certain specified circumstances – for example, if the institution in question suspects that information relates to national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs – as long as they have identified their lawful author ...[+++]ity to obtain that information.

She also pointed out that clause 98 in Bill C-7 amends the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, PIPEDA, to allow organizations to collect personal information without consent for the purposes of disclosing this information to government law enforcement and national security agencies.

The sights of the gigantic data-recording mechanism being promoted by the ΕU are now set on every EU citizen, in that the personal data of every person can be collected and transmitted without their even being suspected of an offence, purely and simply for reasons of public order and security.