Traduction de «dépenses partent de plusieurs hypothèses contestables » (Français → Anglais) :

45. Insists that the focus on structural deficits since the 2005 reform of the SGP, together with the introduction of an expenditure rule with the 2011 reform as well as the concept of output gap which is difficult to quantify, create uncertainty, complexity and margins for flexibility and thus the discretionary implementation of the SGP; fears that the calculation of potential growth and output, which underpins the assessment of structural deficits, and that of the expenditure rule, are subject to several questionable assumptions which lead to substantial revisions between the Commission's autumn and spring forecasts, thereby leading t ...[+++]o various calculations and diverging assessments as regards the implementation of the SGP;

In our democratic system, it is very important that institutions like this are not exposed to comments such as we have heard from the Conservatives—and even from the Prime Minister in the past—comments that question an institution that is fundamental to our system of democracy, an institution that is in place to oversee the organization of elections and to apply the Elections Act. In the case at hand, this institution noticed that a number of Conservative candidates used an unacceptable procedure of claiming reimbursement for their expenses.

The achievement of this objective is surrounded by several risks: (1) GDP growth in 2005 may be below the central scenario of the updated programme. According to the sensitivity analysis performed in the update, under the assumption of a shortfall in nominal growth by half a percentage point in 2004 and in 2005, the headline deficit would lie only marginally below 3% of GDP in 2005 (2) The achievement of the expenditure targets for 2004 and 2005 is uncertain even with growth as expected in the update's central scenario and requires full implementation and efficiency of the measures introduced.

9. Takes the view, however, that the budgetary codecision procedure should differ in one respect from the legislative codecision procedure, in that, since the budget must be adopted in accordance with strict deadlines, the possibility of the ultimate rejection of the finance law as a result of a disagreement between the Council and Parliament cannot be countenanced; emphasises the need to simplify the annual budgetary procedure and make it more transparent, which might make it possible to concentrate the procedure over a shorter period; notes that a number of possible options could be explored with a view to overcoming any disagreement ...[+++] between the two arms of the budgetary authority; provision should, for example, be made either for a mechanism for the automatic entry in the budget of the appropriations required to cover the Union's legislative and contractual commitments, or the award of a "final say" to Parliament, on the basis of a strict maximum rate for the increase in expenditure, determined heading by heading, over the previous financial year; these two approaches could be combined;

9. Takes the view, however, that the budgetary codecision procedure should differ in one respect from the legislative codecision procedure, in that, since the budget must be adopted in accordance with strict deadlines, the possibility of the ultimate rejection of the finance law as a result of a disagreement between the Council and Parliament cannot be countenanced; emphasises the need to simplify the annual budgetary procedure and make it more transparent, which might make it possible to concentrate the procedure over a shorter period; notes that a number of possible options could be explored with a view to overcoming any disagreement ...[+++] between the two arms of the budgetary authority; provision should, for example, be made either for a mechanism for the automatic entry in the budget of the appropriations required to cover the Union's legislative and contractual commitments, or the award of a "final say" to Parliament, on the basis of a strict maximum rate for the increase in expenditure, determined heading by heading, over the previous financial year; these two approaches could be combined;

11. Takes the view, however, that the budgetary codecision procedure should differ in one respect from the legislative codecision procedure, in that, since the budget must be adopted in accordance with strict deadlines, the possibility of the ultimate rejection of the finance law as a result of a disagreement between the Council and Parliament cannot be countenanced; emphasises the need to simplify the annual budgetary procedure and make it more transparent, which might make it possible to concentrate the procedure over a shorter period; notes that a number of possible options could be explored with a view to overcoming any disagreemen ...[+++]t between the two arms of the budgetary authority; provision should, for example, be made either for a mechanism for the automatic entry in the budget of the appropriations required to cover the Union’s legislative and contractual commitments, or the award of a ‘final say’ to Parliament, on the basis of a strict maximum rate for the increase in expenditure, determined heading by heading, over the previous financial year; these two approaches could be combined;

Mr. McCallum was echoing the views of several economists, who have been saying that they support using prudent assumptions in the budget on what might happen to interest rates or economic growth, but not as a cover to have money for last-minute spending programs.

I admit some may not agree with spending several million dollars so that people could show the flag proudly in our country and elsewhere.

Mr. Lieff: The Minister of Finance in his recent economic update has portrayed the impact of a number of different economic assumptions on both expenditures and revenues in terms of what would happen under different scenarios.