Traduction de «examen de surveillance » (Français → Anglais) :

follow-up examination

follow-up examination

financial supervision [ ESFS | European Supervisory Framework | European System of Financial Supervision | EU Supervisory Framework | financial market supervision | financial surveillance | prudential control | prudential supervision | supervision of financial institutions ]

BTWC Review Conference | Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention | Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention | Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Administration Manual for Supervising Teachers

biennial surveillance review | BSR | Biennial Review of Surveillance

border surveillance

admission to examinations [ conditions of admission to examinations ]

examination [ entrance examination ]

60. Notes that in 2013 OLAF issued 353 recommendations for administrative, disciplinary, financial or judicial action to be taken by the relevant EU institutions, bodies, offices, agencies or the competent national authorities, and that about EUR 402,8 million was recommended for recovery; is concerned that the rate of indictment following OLAF’s judicial recommendations for the period 2006-2013 is only about 54 %; is worried, as the low rate of indictment also sheds a bad light on the quality and usability of OLAF’s investigative results; calls on the Commission to urgently improve the effectiveness of OLAF; deems that a fully-fledg ...[+++]ed and proper oversight over OLAF’s affairs by the Supervisory Committee (without interference in ongoing investigations) is indispensable, and therefore urges the Commission and OLAF to improve the current situation in which the Supervisory Committee is not able to fulfil its purpose; also regrets the lack of information available on conviction rates in cases involving offences against the Union’s budget;

59. Notes that in 2013 OLAF issued 353 recommendations for administrative, disciplinary, financial or judicial action to be taken by the relevant EU institutions, bodies, offices, agencies or the competent national authorities, and that about EUR 402.8 million was recommended for recovery; is concerned that the rate of indictment following OLAF’s judicial recommendations for the period 2006-2013 is only about 54 %; is worried, as the low rate of indictment also sheds a bad light on the quality and usability of OLAF’s investigative results; calls on the Commission to urgently improve the effectiveness of OLAF; deems that a fully-fledg ...[+++]ed and proper oversight over OLAF’s affairs by the Supervisory Committee (without interference in ongoing investigations) is indispensable, and therefore urges the Commission and OLAF to improve the current situation in which the Supervisory Committee is not able to fulfil its purpose; also regrets the lack of information available on conviction rates in cases involving offences against the Union’s budget;

where applicable, the findings of the peer review process for cross-border supervision in Article 24(6) and whether the frequency of such reviews could be reduced in future, including an indication of whether such findings indicate the need for more formal colleges of supervisors;

O. whereas in its report of 12 December 2013, the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technology proposes 46 recommendations to the President of the United States; whereas the recommendations stress the need simultaneously to protect national security and personal privacy and civil liberties; whereas in this regard it invites the US Government: to end bulk collection of phone records of US persons under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act as soon as practicable; to undertake a thorough review of the NSA and the US intelligence legal framework in order to ensure respect for the right to privacy; to end efforts to subvert or make vulnerable commercial software (backdoors and malware); to increase the use of encrypt ...[+++]ion, particularly in the case of data in transit, and not to undermine efforts to create encryption standards; to create a Public Interest Advocate to represent privacy and civil liberties before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; to confer on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board the power to oversee Intelligence Community activities for foreign intelligence purposes, and not only for counterterrorism purposes; and to receive whistleblowers’ complaints, to use Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to obtain electronic communications, and not to use surveillance to steal industry or trade secrets;