Traduction de «inférences logiques par seconde » (Français → Anglais) :

11. Observes that the subsidiarity principle as formulated in the Treaties permits Union action in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence only ‘if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’, while, under the proportionality principle, the substance and form of Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties; points out that subsidiarity and proportiona ...[+++]lity are closely related but distinct: while the former relates to the appropriateness of Union action in sectors which do not come within its exclusive competence, the latter relates to proportionality between the means and ends stipulated by the legislator and is a general rule governing the exercise of Union powers; notes that consideration of proportionality regarding a draft legislative act must logically follow consideration of subsidiarity, while, at the same time, verification of subsidiarity would not be sufficiently effective without the verification of proportionality;

20. Observes that the subsidiarity principle as formulated in the Treaties permits Union action in areas which do not fall within the Union’s exclusive competence only ‘if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level, while, under the proportionality principle, the substance and form of Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties; points out that subsidiarity and prop ...[+++]ortionality are closely related but distinct: while the former relates to the appropriateness of Union action in sectors which do not come within the Union’s exclusive competence, the latter relates to proportionality between the means and ends stipulated by the legislator and is a general rule governing the exercise of Union powers; notes that consideration of proportionality regarding a draft legislative act must logically follow consideration of subsidiarity, while, at the same time, verification of subsidiarity would not be sufficiently effective without the verification of proportionality;

9. Takes the view that EU Special Representatives should be further developed rather than gradually phased out, especially to cover countries and regions where the EU does not have a diplomatic mission; considers it essential that, given the importance of human rights issues in conflict and post-conflict situations, all EU Special Representatives should have a mandate which encompasses civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, the rights of women and children, International Humanitarian Law and international justice, and specifically mentions promoting and ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law; stresses that EU Special Representatives are the focal points for internal guidance, expertise and advo ...[+++]cacy, and logical interlocutors for third countries and other non-EU actors; welcomes the designation of at least one individual in each EU delegation as a contact person to lead human rights policy coordination, mainstreaming and monitoring;

But I had a young summer student do an academic investigation and a paper into the definition of “inference”, and it came back conclusively from numerous sources, fully attributed, that an inference is not a measure of truthfulness, it is a measure of sound logic and reasoning.

87. Recognises attempts by the Council and the Commission to organise a second round of the European Union-Uzbekistan dialogue on human rights in May 2008 and commends the Commission on its efforts to organise a civil society seminar on media expression in the margins of the dialogue, possibly in Tashkent; points out once again that the holding of a dialogue on human rights and experts" meetings on the 2005 Andijan massacre do not in themselves constitute progress and cannot be used as a reason for the lifting of sanctions; notes that the absence of an independent international inquiry into the Andijan massacre and the lack of any impr ...[+++]ovement in the human rights situation in Uzbekistan – these being the conditions laid down by the European Union for the lifting of sanctions – have logically led to the sanctions against Uzbekistan being extended; welcomes the fact that the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 15-16 October 2007 have introduced specific conditions which have to be met within a period of six months in order for the visa restriction suspension to be maintained; invites the Council and the Commission to carry out a serious assessment of the impact of the decision to suspend for six months some of the visa restrictions that form part of the European Union sanctions against Uzbekistan, and to review the overall human rights situation in the country; deplores the fact that Uzbekistan has so far failed to deliver any progress in any of these respects; pays tribute to the work done by its Subcommittee on Human Rights in closely monitoring the human rights situation every six months so as to provide the Council with regular parliamentary assessments and recommendations as regards the EU policy to be adopted in this matter; is appalled by the presidential election held on 23 December 2007 in Uzbekistan, which according to the ODIHR was 'held in a strictly controlled political environment, leaving no room for real oppositio ...

The functions of each institution would be clarified by such a system of Community law hierarchy: Treaties would be adopted by unanimous decision of the Council followed by ratification by national parliaments, laws would be adopted on a Commission proposal by co-decision of the Council and the Parliament and the Commission or the Member States would be responsible for implementing provisions, the former under Council and Parliament supervision. * Those who are opposed to this system do not deny its clarity, but refute its logic, which is based on the idea of separation of powers within a State, since this approach would transform the Counc ...[+++]il into a second legislative chamber and the Commission into the European executive.