Traduction de «point d'arrêt » (Français → Anglais) :

bus stop sign | bus stop post

judgment of the Court (EU) [ Court of Justice judgment | judgment of the CJEC | judgment of the Court of Justice (EU) | judgment of the EC Court | judgment of the EC Court of Justice ]

By their seventh ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 134 of its judgment when it ruled that Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 (the criterion at issue) is compatible with the principles of the rule of law and more generally with EU law, since it is ‘neither arbitrary nor discretionary’, and, in paragraph 140 of its judgment, that ‘the criterion at issue limits the Council’s discretion, by establishing objective criteria, and guarantees the degree of foreseeability required by EU law’. In that regard, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by interpreting the ...[+++]criterion at issue by reference to the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council (C-380/09 P).

It is apparent from paragraph 23 of the Wallentin judgment that a technical problem can be considered to be covered by ‘unexpected flight safety shortcomings’ and is therefore an ‘event’ within the meaning of paragraph 22 of the Wallentin judgment; the circumstances surrounding that event may nevertheless be regarded as extraordinary if they relate to an event which is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activities of the air carrier and beyond the actual control of that carrier on account of its nature or origin, as provided in paragraph 23 of the Wallentin judgment; according to paragraph 24 thereof, the resolution of a technical problem which can be traced back to poor maintenance of an aircraft ...[+++] is inherent in the normal exercise of an air carrier’s activity; therefore, according to paragraph 25 of the Wallentin judgment, such technical problems cannot constitute extraordinary circumstances.

44. Calls on the Commission to prepare guidelines for Member States on how to bring any instruments of personal data collection for the purpose of the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorism, in line with the judgments of the CJEU of 8 April 2014 on data retention (Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12) and of 6 October 2015 on Safe Harbour (Case C‑362/14); points in particular to paragraphs 58 and 59 of the data retention judgment and to paragraphs 93 and 94 of the Safe Harbour judgment, which clearly demand a targeted approach for data collection rather than a ‘full take’;

Pursuant to the principle of the rule of law in criminal matters, the Court of Justice has also recently ruled (in its judgment of 3 May 2005, cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02) that a directive 'cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive' (judgment of the Court of 8 October 1987, Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nilmegen, reports page 3969, point 13, and judgment of 7 January 2004, in cases C-60/02, X, not yet published in the reports, ...[+++]point 61, and the case law cited therein).