Traduction de «intesa » (Italien → Anglais) :

restrictive trade practice [ Restrictive business practices(ECLAS) ]

Common Understanding | Common Understanding on delegated acts | Common Understanding on practical arrangements for the use of delegated acts

Common Understanding | Common Understanding between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Delegated Acts | Common Understanding on Delegated Acts

Paris Memorandum of Understanding | Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control | Paris MoU | PMoU [Abbr.]

restrictive-practice notification

Convention of 9 September 1966 between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital and for the Prevention of Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion | Convention of 9 September 1966 between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Convention of 26 April 1966 between the Swiss Confederation and Spain for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Convention of 8.November 1966 between the Swiss Confederation and Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Italy selected Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa) as the buyer in an open, fair and transparent sales procedure: The measures will also enable the wind down of the remaining liquidation mass, financed by loans provided by Intesa.

i. to urge the negotiating parties to establish regulatory disciplines in the area of financial services going beyond the WTO’s GATS Annex on Financial Services, which already covers all TiSA parties as WTO members, as well as deeper commitments going beyond the sui generis Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, which is not mandatory for WTO members and therefore only covers a very limited set of TiSA parties; to aim at including in the chapter of TiSA on financial services a prudential carve-out building on the version agreed in the Canada-EU Trade Agreement which steps up the carve-out laid down in Article 2(a) of the GA ...[+++]TS Annex on Financial Services, which preserves the sovereign right of parties to adopt measures for prudential reasons, to the extent that these measures do not aim at escaping other commitments, with a view to ensuring that governments retain the ability to take necessary actions to maintain the stability and integrity of the financial system; to take action in order for the key elements of the Understanding, such as the specific provisions on data transfer and non-discriminatory access to clearing systems, to be taken over in TiSA, while improving the drafting of the Understanding to bring it in line with the exact current policy lines of the EU in these areas;

31. Notes that the recommendations contained in the MoUs are at odds with the modernisation policy drawn up in the form of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy; further notes the fact that Member States with MoUs are exempt from all European Semester reporting processes, including reporting under the anti-poverty and social inclusion targets, and do not receive Country Specific Recommendations aside from implementation of their MoUs; recalls that the MoUs need to be adapted in order to take into account the practice and institutions for wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s ...[+++]strategy for growth and jobs as set out in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 (Article7(1)); urges that this be done where it is not yet the case; points out, however, that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political, economic and financial environment;

56. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes, however, that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives and the effective scrutiny capacity of national parliaments, as demonstrated in the case of the refusal of the original MoU by the Cypriot parliament; notes, however, that when consulted, national parliaments were faced with the choice between eventually defaulting on their debt or accepting Memoranda of Understanding negotiated between the Troika and national authorities; points out that the MoU was ...[+++]not ratified by the national parliament in Portugal; notes with concern that the fact that the Troika is made up of three independent institutions with an uneven distribution of responsibility between them, coupled with differing mandates, as well as negotiation and decision-making structures with different levels of accountability, has resulted in a lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic accountability of the Troika as a whole;