Traduction de «Atteinte portée à la sécurité des ordinateurs » (Français → Anglais) :

28. Points out that the current Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 seeks to limit the scope of the ‘space to think’ by stipulating that, as a prerequisite for refusal to grant access, disclosure of the document must not merely undermine the decision-making process, but must ‘seriously’ undermine it, and in any case allowing this limit to be overstepped where there is ‘an overriding public interest in disclosure’; stresses however that in spite of the above-mentioned considerations, Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 contains an open-ended definition which does not provide clear conditions for application or take into ...[+++] account the case-law of the Court of Justice; stresses the need for an appropriate definition in accordance with the concept of legal certainty by narrowing the concept;

In the context of national security, non-disclosure, which may be extensive, coupled with the grave intrusions on liberty imposed on a detainee, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to find substitute procedures that will satisfy section 7.

C. having regard to the statement, made by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 28 November 2006 (at Princeton University) that the retention of nuclear weapons by some might motivate others to acquire such arms: "by clinging to and modernising their own arsenals .nuclear-weapon states encourage others .to regard nuclear weapons as essential, both to their security and to their status"; concerned, against this background, that the credibility of the EU in promoting the NPT is undermined by the plans of both France and the UK to modernise their nuclear weapon arsenals,

That would, as has been said, be a decisive retrograde step. As I said before, this Parliament has no influence at all, either legally or constitutionally, but the debate may be of use in raising the storm that will be necessary for checking these attempts to undermine legal certainty.

Circumstances where the circumvention of TPMs is allowed include: law enforcement and national security activities (section 41.11); reverse engineering for software compatibility (section 41.12); encryption research (section 41.13); verification as to whether a TPM permits the collection or communication of personal information (section 41.14); security testing of computer systems (section 41.15); access for persons with perceptual disabilities (section 41.16); temporary recordings made by broadcasters for technical reasons (section 41.17); and unlocking cellphones (“gaining access to a telecommunications service by means of a rad ...[+++]io apparatus,” section 41.18).71

Circumstances where the circumvention of TPMs is allowed include: law enforcement and national security activities (section 41.11); reverse engineering for software compatibility (section 41.12); encryption research (section 41.13); verification as to whether a TPM permits the collection or communication of personal information (section 41.14); security testing of computer systems (section 41.15); access for persons with perceptual disabilities (section 41.16); temporary recordings made by broadcasters for technical reasons (section 41.17); and unlocking cellphones (“gaining access to a telecommunications service by means of a rad ...[+++]io apparatus,” section 41.18).66