Traduction de «Comitato di vigilanza » (Italien → Anglais) :

OLAF Supervisory Committee | Supervisory Committee | Supervisory Committee of OLAF | Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office | Surveillance Committee

Basel Committee for Banking Supervision

higher supervisory authority

Supervisory Board for Guardianship Matters

System Safety and Security Committee (European GNSS Supervisory Authority)

financial supervision [ ESFS | European Supervisory Framework | European System of Financial Supervision | EU Supervisory Framework | financial market supervision | financial surveillance | prudential control | prudential supervision | supervision of financial institutions ]

Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices

community support officer | countryside ranger | community safety warden | street warden

EU banking union [ EDIS | European deposit insurance scheme | Single resolution mechanism | Single supervisory mechanism | SRM | SSM ]

5. Urges the Commission to facilitate the negotiations between OLAF and the SC by drawing up an action plan by 31 December 2015 with a view to amending the Working Arrangements to create a working environment in which the SC can fulfil its mandate; takes the view that the amended Working Arrangements should clarify the SC’s role to all the parties concerned; notes that the secretariat of the supervisory body is under the (administrative) control of the supervised body;

A. whereas in its Annual Activity Report 2014 the OLAF Supervisory Committee (SC) noted that at the time of the reorganisation of OLAF (1 February 2012), 423 cases were opened on the same day by a single decision of the Director-General of OLAF (OLAF DG); whereas, on the basis of its analysis, the SC concluded that (i) OLAF did not conduct any appropriate assessment of the incoming information for any of the cases analysed by the SC, (ii) for the vast majority of cases there was not even a trace of any assessment activity, and (iii) the OLAF DG opened all the cases in question without establishing beforehand the existence of a sufficie ...[+++]ntly serious suspicion that there had been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union – which is in contradiction with the legal requirement for opening an OLAF investigation in force at that time;

D. whereas the SC – in its note on the OLAF draft Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) for 2015 – observed that OLAF had not taken into account the three recommendations made in the SC’s Opinion No 1/2014: (i) the OLAF DG had not issued guidelines on the application of the selection principles arising from Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (efficient use of resources, proportionality/subsidiarity, added value) and, instead of reviewing the financial indicators to adapt them to the reality of spending programmes, had abolished them completely; (ii) the draft IPPs for 2015 appeared to take into consideration several documents from stakeholders, but no dialogue with the stakeholders seemed to have taken place with regard to financial in ...[+++]dicators and to possible follow-up of the cases showing sufficient suspicion of fraud, but which had been dismissed on the basis of the IPPs or the selection principles; (iii) the OLAF DG had not forwarded to the SC an assessment of the application of the previous IPPs or a summary of the feedback provided by stakeholders, despite a previous commitment to do so;

J. whereas Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 reinforced the SC’s role in monitoring the duration of OLAF’s investigations; whereas, notwithstanding OLAF’s formal compliance with its obligation to report regularly to the SC on investigations lasting more than 12 months, the SC concluded, in its Opinion No 4/2014 entitled ‘Control of the duration of investigations conducted by OLAF’, that the information provided to it had been insufficient to enable it to properly and effectively monitor the duration of OLAF’s investigations;